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ABSTRACT
　Previous studies have revealed that rural households in developing countries attempt to cope with 
adverse shocks by dyadic risk-sharing with other households or by membership-based insurance 
arrangements at community level. This article examines another type of risk-sharing arrangements, 
community-based charity-type safety net, where people give a donation to other members in their 
community who suffer from hardship, using the case of sangkeaha in rural Cambodia. Specifically, 
this study examines the extent to which sangkeaha protects people against health shocks, with what 
motives people participate in it, who benefits more from it, and the effect of rules on people’s 
participation in sangkeaha. The analysis of primary data collected in Takeo province provides the 
following findings.
　Even though participation is voluntary, sangkeaha can collect large amounts of donations from 
people in light of the economic situation of rural Cambodia, but the amounts are nonetheless often 
insufficient to cover the medical costs that recipients incur. In addition, many cases of severe illness 
and injury are left unprotected even by sangkeaha.
　Nonetheless, various motives besides simple altruism seem to encourage them to make donation in 
sangekaha. Normative altruism is manifested as a motive by people’s perception of merit-making in 
making donation. Because relationships of mutual help are created among villagers through 
sangkeaha, people seem to participate in it to conform to the norm of returning favors in the context 
of both dyadic and general reciprocity. Furthermore, because of the reciprocal relationship between 
villagers, insurance motive also seem to induce people to make donation.
　In line with the expectation for the charity-type safety net, poor people are not discriminated 
against in sangkeaha. On the other hand, the amount of donation collected and the asset size of 
recipient has U-shaped relationship, indicating that donation in sangkeaha is induced not only by 
altruism.
　The extent to which people participate in sangkeaha is influenced by rules adopted. In the 
surveyed villages, the unconditionality rule that any villager is eligible to receive donation increases 
the participation rate especially in large villages, which indicates that people’s participation can be 
promoted by making them have the sense of general reciprocity.
　These findings reveals the potential of community-based charity-type safety-net schemes for 
providing protection to rural populations in developing countries, with its advantages of not 
excluding poor people and marked sustainability. In this connection, the case of sangkeaha indicates 
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that reported problems of CBHI such as the exclusion of the poorest segment of population and the 
high rate of drop-out would be alleviated by making the members of a CBHI scheme perceive it as a 
mechanism of mutual help among them.
　However, the charity-type safety net scheme would be introduced only in cohesive communities 
in which its members have intimate relationships with dedicated voluntary organizers. Because the 
voluntary nature is its key, what the government and outside NGOs can do to promote the charity-
type safety net would be also limited.
Ⅰ．Introduction
　For rural households in developing countries, how well they can cope with adverse shocks such as 
crop failure and illness of family members is extremely important in avoiding descent into poverty. 
Because safety nets are scarcely provided by the public sector in developing countries, people must 
cope with shocks by themselves through measures such as drawing on savings, selling assets, and 
through migration of household members. Dyadic risk-sharing with other households in the form of 
loans or gifts is often adopted. The effectiveness of such informal risk-coping strategies has been 
examined extensively(Alderman, 1996; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas, 
1998).
　In addition to these self-insurance and risk-sharing arrangements, group-based or community-
based risk-sharing arrangements also exist. For example, community-based health insurance 
(CBHI) has been introduced by NGOs in many countries in recent years (Ekman, 2004; Carrin, 
Waelkens and Criel, 2005). Funeral associations in some African countries can be called semi-formal 
insurance schemes that provide a certain level of protection to their members without the 
involvement of government or NGOs (Dercon, et al., 2006; Mariam, 2003).
　A salient issue of concern related to these risk-coping mechanisms is that they are often 
unavailable to poor people. Self-insurance is an unsuitable option for asset-poor households (Jalan 
and Ravallion, 2001; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). Forming a risk-sharing network with other 
households is also difficult for those who lack the resources necessary to lend help to the partner. In 
fact, some studies have revealed that poorer households tend to be excluded from such networks 
(De Weerdt, 2004; Goldstein, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2004). Evidence also shows that poorer people 
are less likely to participate in CBHI and group-based semi-formal insurance (Ekman, 2004; Jütting, 
2004; LeMay-Boucher, 2007, 2009; Mariam, 2003) probably because they cannot afford to pay 
premiums or member fees.
　An alternative to these risk-sharing arrangements is community-based “charity-type” activity for 
those who confront adverse shocks. Unlike CBHIs and funeral associations described above, this is 
not membership-based; people donate money or food to other members in their community who 
suffer from hardship. For instance, some rural villages in Cambodia have such a charity-type activity 
called sangkeaha, or “aid” in Khmer (Yagura, 2005), which is generally organized for those who 
become severely ill. This kind of charity-type safety net is expected to provide protection even to 
the poorest people in a community because no member fee or contribution is necessary to receive a 
donation through it.
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　To the author's knowledge, charity-type safety net has not been studied in the context of 
development studies. First of all, this type of safety net seems to be rarely found in the 
contemporary developing world, as the author could find no reported case in neighboring Laos, 
Thailandand Vietnam.１） Nevertheless, charity-type safety net is worth promoting if it is pro-poor 
and can provide sufficient protection for people. 
　A fundamental question in charity-type safety net is how people are motivated to participate in it, 
or make donation, when receiving protection is not linked with making donation. In other words, in 
charity-type safety net, people would not have “insurance motive” or expectation of protection for 
future adverse shocks, which is supposed to be the major motive for participation in membership-
based insurance programs. Naturally, altruistic feeling toward recipients who suffer from hardship 
can be the major motive, but people may have such feeling only with those who are close to them, 
not with community members in general.
　This argument indicates that charity-type safety net can provide sufficient protection, or attract 
people’s participation, when people can also have motives other than altruism. As discussed later, 
people’s motive to make donation in charity-type safety net can vary according to its rules and the 
way it is implemented, which can change the meanings people attach to their donation and the type 
and the size of benefits (in a broad sense) they expect to receive by making donation. Therefore, 
the potential of charity-type safety net can be explored by examining its rules and the way it is 
implemented as well as people’s motives to participate in it.
　Against this backdrop, using the case of sangkeaha in rural Cambodia, this paper examines the 
performance and the potential of charity-type safety net by linking them with people’s motive to 
participate as well as its rules and the way it is organized. Concretely, this paper is aimed at 
examining the followings questions: (1) does sangkeaha provide people with sufficient protection? 
(Section IV) (2) what kind of motives can be aroused by the rules and the way sangkeaha is 
organized and(3) with what motives do people actually make donation in sangkeaha? (Section V); 
(4) do poor people benefit through sangkeaha on an equality with non-poor people?(Section VI); (5) 
under what kind of rules is people’s participation in sangkeaha promoted? (Section VII). To tackle 
these questions, Section II presents theoretical analysis on factors evoking various types of motives 
to make donation and the effect of motive on the participation and the amount of donation in 
charity-type safety net. Section III describes how the data used in this paper was collected, the 
situation of the research site, the history of sangkeaha and how sangkeaha is organized in the 
surveyed villages. Finally, in Section VIII, the findings of this study are summarized and some policy 
implications are presented.
　There have been few studies of sangkeaha. Yagura (2005) only briefly describes the operation of 
sangkeaha and its effectiveness as a safety net. Using econometric analysis, Chhair (2012) examines 
the determinants of the amount of donations to sangkeaha and argues that people make donation 
more as obligation than charity when the recipient is their relative. But, obligation-charity dichotomy 
is too simplistic as the motive to donate. Furthermore, questions mentioned above except question 
(3) are not addressed in Chhair (2012).
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Ⅱ．Motive to Donate in Charity-type Safety Net: Theory
１．Types of motives and factors evoking them
　A Safety net scheme needs contribution from its participants (members) to provide them with 
protection when they suffer adverse shocks. Especially, in insurance-type schemes, making a 
contribution (i.e. paying premium) is the condition to receive benefits. In charity-type schemes, 
however, making contribution (or donation) is not the prerequisite for receiving benefits. 
Nevertheless, providing benefits to members is only possible when people make sufficient 
contributions.
　As making contributions entails cost, people need to have some motives to do so. It is important to 
understand people’s motives to make contributions because they can have a large impact on the 
performance of the scheme. For example, in a dyadic risk sharing arrangement, if altruistic feeling is 
the motive to make a transfer to a risk sharing partner, transfers would be made to the partner 
whenever he suffers a negative shock even if transfers between partners are unbalanced(De Weerdt 
and Fafchamps, 2011; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001). This is a property beneficial to those who are 
more vulnerable to shocks.
　The type of the motive of people to make contributions would depend on the rule of the scheme 
and the way the scheme is implemented. For instance, people would be more likely to have 
“insurance motive,” or making contributions in order to have protection against future negative 
shocks, when making contributions is the condition of receiving benefits. When those who fail to 
make a contribution face sanctions of any kind (including informal ones), avoidance of sanction can 
become a motive to make contributions. In this case, the contribution can be rather regarded as tax.
　In charity-type safety net, people are less likely to have insurance motive because receiving 
benefits is not conditional on making contributions, and therefore other motives would play an 
important role. Among such “non-insurance motives,” altruistic feeling toward those who suffer 
negative shocks would be the major motive.
　Altruism can be classified into hedonic altruism and normative altruism (Kolm, 2006). For people 
with hedonic altruism, the improvement of the welfare of the recipient makes them happy. People 
would be more likely to have hedonic altruism when recipients are identified and when people have 
close relationship with the recipients. Making transfer directly to recipients, by which people feel 
that their contributions really help the recipient, would also evoke hedonic altruism. People make 
contributions out of normative altruism when they find normative values in doing so. Characterizing 
(explicitly or implicitly) contributions as having normative value would induce people to have such a 
motive.
　When people perceive reciprocal relationship with other particular members through the safety 
net scheme, the norm of reciprocity, or the norm of returning a favor, can motivate people to make 
contributions. This motive explains cases in which a person D makes a donation to R to return the 
favor R gave to D in the past. The dyadic reciprocity is perceived when those who make a 
contribution can identify the recipient and vice versa.
　Under situations where dyadic reciprocal relationships are perceived by members, people can also 
have insurance motive. Because of dyadic reciprocity, the amount of benefits one expects to receive 
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from other members when she suffers a negative shock would depend on whether and how much 
she gave to other members in the past. Therefore, expectation of receiving larger benefits would 
motivate people to make contributions. Nevertheless, a large part of members can have such an 
insurance motive only when the probability of receiving benefits is not too low for them; in other 
words, when benefits are provided for shocks that are not so rare and when all members 
irrespective of their attributes such as age and the economic status can receive benefits.
　Furthermore, people might be conscious of “general reciprocity” (Kolm, 2008), or norm of 
returning a favor to others in general, when any members can receive benefits with a certain level 
of probability. Under such a condition, one can believe that other members will help her once she 
suffers a negative shock, and therefore she would feel obliged to make contributions in return for 
other members, even for those who do not have dyadic relationship with her.
　As given above, there can be many motives, and we must recognize that a person can have 
different motives at one time.
２．Effect of motive on the participation and the amount of donation
　This subsection presents a theoretical model to examine the effect of people’s motive on whether 
and how much people make a contribution in a charity-type safety net scheme̶a scheme in a 
village through which villagers voluntarily make donation to those villagers who suffer a negative 
shock of some severity. Making donation is not a prerequisite for becoming the recipient of the 
donation. A special attention is paid to non-insurance motives, which are supposed to be a great 
importance in charity-type safety net. 
　For simplification, the model depicts the decision making of a villager k in two periods. In each 
period, k earns a fixed income y. In the first period, k does not experience a negative shock but is 
asked to make a donation d to other villagers (0 yd <≤ y). In the second period, k experiences a 
negative shock with a probability p (0<p<1) which causes a monetary loss of l, (0< l< y) but other 
villagers are expected to donate r to her. Savings and borrowing are assumed to be impossible, and 
therefore k spends y－d on consumption in the first period and y－ l＋ r in the second period if she 
suffers a shock and y if she does not experiences shock.
　Her utility U in the first period is derived from consumption c as well as from “non-insurance 
benefit” denoted by m, which represents satisfaction felt by making a donation. The sense of 
security for the shock is not included in m but is reflected by the increase in consumption (by r) in 
the second period in case of suffering adverse shock. To capture the effects of non-insurance benefit 
on k’s decision making, it is assumed that m＝μM (d, x), where μ is a parameter determining the 
magnitude of non-insurance benefit and M is a function linking the amount of donation to the 
magnitude of satisfaction, and x stands for any variable affecting the relationship between d and m. 
In the second period, because k is not assumed to make a donation, only c determines the utility.
　In this setting, the expected utility in the two periods for k is given as below:
　　V＝U (y － d, m)＋δ｛ p ［qU (y－l＋r)＋(1－q) U (y－l)］ ＋(1－p) U (y)}
where, δ (0<δ yd <≤0 1) is a time preference factor, and q (0 yd <≤ q yd <≤0 1) is the probability that the village 
organizes a charity for k when she experiences a negative shock. It is assumed that r＝R(d, y) so as 
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to take into consideration the possibility that other villagers decide whether and how much they 
donate to k based on how much she donates in the first period and her income level. 
　If derivatives of any differentiable function F (a, b) is expressed as Fa≡ aFFa ∂∂≡ F/ aFa ∂ , Faa≡ aFFa ∂∂≡ F2/ aFF ∂∂≡ 2a and 
Fab≡ aFFa ∂∂≡ F 2/ aFFa ∂∂≡ b aFFa ∂∂≡ , then, it is assumed that Uc>0, Ucc<0, Um>0, Umm<0, and Ucm>0 under the decreasing 
marginal utility and the complementarity of consumption and non-insurance benefits.2） Md>0, Mdd<0, 
Rd > 0 and Rdd < 0 are also natural assumptions.
　The optimal amount of donation d* for k, which maximizes V, satisfies the following equation: 
　　
aFFa ∂∂≡ V
aFFa ∂∂≡ d
＝－Uc (c1, m)＋Um (c1, m) μMd ＋δpqUc (c2) Rd＝0……(1)
where c1＝y－d and c2＝y－l＋r. The second order differential of V is negative and hence V has a 
maximum value. The first term of the equation (1) is negative and thus regarded as representing 
the cost of donation. The second term is positive and represents non-insurance benefits. The third 
term is positive when Rd>0 and thus represents insurance benefit in the sense that it shows the 
extent of increase in the amount of donation k will receive in response to the increase in donation 
she made in the first period. If Rd=0, or when r does not depend on d, she cannot perceive insurance 
benefit in the scheme.
　We will now examine factors affecting the decision of k on whether she makes a donation or not. 
Given that V is a concave function, k voluntarily makes a donation (d*>0) if lim aFFa ∂∂≡ V/ aFFa ∂≡ d>0
d →0
. In other 
words, the following inequality holds when d is close to 0:
　　Um (c1, m) μMd ＋δpqUc (c2) Rd>Uc (c1, m)……(2)
　This inequality is likely to hold when p, q, or Rd is large, which indicates a large insurance benefit. 
However, even when insurance benefit is not expected (that is, the second term of the left hand side 
of the inequation(2) is zero), k has incentive to donate as long as her utility is increased to a large 
degree due to non-insurance benefits, like when μ is sufficiently large. As is the effect of altruism 
shown theoretically by (De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011), existence of non-insurance motive would 
promote people’s participation in a risk sharing scheme. Furthermore, based on the assumption that 
Umc>0, the first term of the left hand side of the inequation(2) increases with income level, indicating 
that the larger the income level the stronger the incentive to make a donation. On the other hand, 
for low-income villagers to have the incentive to donate, μ should be large enough to compensate for 
the smaller Um. This means that whether one makes a donation or not depend much on the 
magnitude of non-insurance benefits especially for poorer people.
　We will next examine the effect of change in parameters on the optimal donation. As is apparent 
from the equation (1), d* changes according to the value of parameters (y, μ, x, p, q). To examine the 
effect of the parameter change, a function G (d, y, μ, x, p, q)≡ aFFa ∂∂≡ V/ aFFa ∂d is defined. Because G=0 when 
d=d*, and because aFFa ∂∂≡ G/ aFFa ∂≡ d= aFFa ∂∂≡ V 2/ aFFa ∂∂≡ 2d≠0, the implicit function theorem tells us that aFFa ∂∂≡ d */ aFFa ∂∂≡ t=－( aFa ∂∂≡ G/ aFFa ∂≡ t)/( aFFa ∂∂≡ G/ aFFa ∂≡ d) 
for each of the parameters t. Notice that aFFa ∂∂≡ d */ aFFa ∂∂≡ t and aFFa ∂∂≡ G/ aFFa ∂≡ t have the same sign because aFFa ∂∂≡ G/ aFFa ∂≡ d<0.
　Based on this, the direction of the effect of an increase in k’s own income y is represented by the 
equation (3): 
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aFFa ∂∂≡ G
aFFa ∂∂≡ y
＝－Ucc (c1, m)＋Umc (c1, m) μMd ＋δpqUcc (c2) Rd＋δpqUc (c2) Rdy……(3)
　The sign of the right hand side is undetermined because the first and the second terms are 
positive while the third term is negative. The forth term is also negative if Rdy<0, or when villagers 
are motivated by altruism with which they will make larger donation for poorer people (as discussed 
below). Nevertheless, the overall sign is more likely to be positive when the magnitude of non-
insurance benefit, μ, is sufficiently large. In other words, income level of donors and the amount of 
donation they make are more likely to have positive relationship when they have stronger non-
insurance motives.
　The increase in μ is assessed by the equation (4):
　　
aFFa ∂∂≡ G
aFFa ∂∂≡ μ
＝－Ucm (c1, m)M＋Um (c1, m) Md ＋μMdUmm (c1, m) M……(4)
　The overall sign of the right hand side is undetermined as the first and the third terms are 
negative but the second term is positive. The larger magnitude of non-insurance benefit does not 
necessarily increase donation because larger μ means that one can gain a large utility with a small 
donation.
　As is apparent from the following formula, an increase in the probability of experiencing a shock 
has positive impact on d*: 
　　
aFFa ∂∂≡ G
aFFa ∂∂≡ p
＝δqUc (c2) Rd……(5)
　Similarly, an increase in q also leads to increase in donation (just replacing p with q in the equation 
(5)). This result indicates that a higher probability of receiving benefits, which provides people with 
insurance motive, induces people to make a larger donation.
　What x in the function M represents varies according to the type of non-insurance motive. In case 
altruism is the motive, k’s utility is increased by making donation because her donation increases the 
welfare level of the recipient, which, for example, can be assessed by recipient’s income. Then, it is 
reasonable to assume that x represents recipient’s income, z, and that M (d, x)＝M (z＋d). The 
impact of an increase in z is assessed by the equation (6):
　　
aFFa ∂∂≡ G
aFFa ∂∂≡ z
＝－Ucm (c1, m) μMz＋μ2Umm (c1, m) M 2z＋μUm (c1, m) Mzz……(6)
　Apparently, Mz＝Md>0 and Mzz＝Mdd<0, and therefore all the terms are negative. That is, as is 
indicated by previous studies on the effect of altruism on income transfer (such as Cox, 1987), people 
would make a larger donation for poorer recipients if they are altruistically motivated. 
　When dyadic reciprocity is behind k’s motive to donate, making a donation increase her utility 
because it is an act of returning a favor to the partner of reciprocity who had helped her in the past. 
Therefore, h, the size of help given by the recipient to k in the past, determines the size of non-
insurance benefit of making a donation. The impact of the increase in h on d* is expressed by the 
equation (7).
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aFFa ∂∂≡ G
aFFa ∂∂≡ h
＝－Ucm (c1, m) μMh＋μ2Umm (c1, m) MhMd＋μUm (c1, m) Mdh……(7)
The right hand side of the equation is positive as long as Mh<0 and Mdh>0. This condition is met in 
certain set of d and h if M has logistic-curve like shape with respect to d and if the increase in h 
magnifies the curve, as is depicted in Figure 1 (where Mh<0 and Mdh>0 when d1<d<d2). Such 
condition is not unreasonable. The logistic-curve like shape is plausible because marginal effect of 
donation would become almost zero after a donor wholly returns the favor to the recipient. With the 
size of donation being constant, an increase in h can increase psychological debt owed to the 
recipient and thus reduce the satisfaction level of the donor (Mh<0). Therefore, the positive 
correlation between the donation and the assistance the donor received from the recipient is a clear 
sign that dyadic reciprocity underlies donor’s motive.
d1 h1 d h22
d
M  
M(d ) |h=h1 
M(d )|h=h2
O 
Figure 1. Relationship between donation (d) and non-
insurance benefit (M) under varying size of help given 
by the recipient (h).
Source: Prepared by the author.
　When k has in mind general reciprocity in making a donation, her making a donation is regarded 
as returning a favor to villagers in general, most of who are expected to help her once she suffers a 
negative shock. In this case, it is assumed that, the higher the probability that she receives donation 
( =pq), the larger the utility gain by increasing the amount of donation she makes. That is, with s≡pq, 
Mds>0 is assumed. Using the same logic as for dyadic reciprocity mentioned above, with d being 
constant, an increase in s would reduce the satisfaction from making a donation (Ms<0). The effect 
of an increase in s is assessed by the following formula:
　　
aFFa ∂∂≡ G
aFFa ∂∂≡ s
＝－Ucm (c1, m) μMs＋μ2Umm (c1, m) MsMd＋μUm (c1, m) Mds＋δUc (c2) Rd……(8)
　All the terms are positive. As is the case when people make a donation with insurance motive, 
higher probability of becoming a recipient increase the amount of donation if general reciprocity 
induces their donation.
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Ⅲ．Introduction to Sangkeaha
１．Research Site and Field Survey 
　Data were collected in Treang, a rice-growing district in Takeo province of the southern part of 
Cambodia. The farms, near the capital city Phnom Penh, are generally small (around one hectare per 
household). Therefore, an increasing number of laborers have migrated to Phnom Penh as well as 
other parts of the country to work in recent years.
　The survey was administered by the author and assistants in two rounds. In the first round, all 
but three villages in the district, 151 in all, were visited during December 2009 ‒ January 2010 
(“village survey”). Through the village survey, we collected information from the village chief and 
the sangkeaha organizers of each village about sangkeaha as well as the general socioeconomic 
situation of the village. In the second round of the surveys conducted during August‒September 
2010, we visited 12 villages which practiced sangkeaha. They were selected so that sangkeaha of 
various types in terms of rule were included in the sample. In these 12 villages, we visited 300 
randomly selected households (25 households in each village) (“household survey”) as well as 22 
households for which sangkeaha was organized in 2010 (“recipient survey”). We also collected 
information from sangkeaha organizers in the 12 villages (“organizer survey”).
２．Formal safety nets against health shocks
　Most Cambodian people are not covered by formal safety nets against health-related shocks. For 
poor households, however, the Cambodian government introduced a scheme called the “health equity 
fund” (HEF) by which households identified as poor are exempted from payment of user fees at 
public healthcare facilities. Reportedly, HEF has a positive effect for improving poor people’s access 
to healthcare (Jacobs and Price, 2006; Noirhomme et al., 2007). Actually, HEF is implemented in 
Treang district. Among the 300 households interviewed, 24 households were found to have an HEF 
beneficiary card.
　Residents in Treang district can also join a health insurance program which has been managed by 
an NGO since 2008. By paying a premium every month, the insurance participants can receive 
healthcare at public hospital and health centers, principally for free. Although the beneficiaries of 
HEF are the poorest segment of population, this health insurance program is targeted at less-poor 
people who can afford to pay the premium regularly. Probably because the program has just started 
in the district, only 9 out of the 300 sample households had joined the health insurance at the time of 
the survey. Another 10 households had joined but withdrew from it for reasons such as inability to 
pay the premium and dissatisfaction with the quality of services at public healthcare facilities.
３．History of sangkeaha
　According to the village survey, 126 villages among 151 villages surveyed have sangkeaha or a 
similar activity at the time of the survey, indicating that sangkeaha is widespread in Treang district.
　It is not easy to trace the history of sangkeaha because most villages in Treang district were 
established during or before the French colonial period. Nevertheless, among the 126 villages with 
sangkeaha at the time of the survey, at least 30 villages had sangkeaha before the Pol Pot era (1975-
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79). The other 50 villages started sangkeaha in the 2000s. Consequently, although sangkeaha is 
apparently a traditional activity, it has diffused most widely and rapidly among the villages in 
Treang district in recent years.
　According to the village survey, the initiative to start sangkeaha was taken mostly by village chiefs 
and achars. Achars are male (generally elderly) lay persons who are involved in the management of 
the Buddhist temple (wat) as a member of the “wat management committee” (achar wat) or who 
perform ceremonies in the village (achar phum). In most cases, sangkeaha was started in the sample 
villages because the founders (village chief or achars) had seen many villagers falling into destitute 
circumstances as a result of illness or other cause.
　As discussed later, people generally relate participation in sangkeaha to merit-making, which is 
highly valued under Theravada Buddhism, the religion followed by most Cambodians (ethnic 
Khmer). This observation suggests a certain link between sangkeaha and Buddhism. In fact, in about 
a half of the villages surveyed, Buddhist monks also sometimes participate in sangkeaha (making 
donations). However, the role of monks in the management of sangkeaha is extremely limited; monks 
took the initiative in starting sangkeaha in only seven villages.
　No involvement in sangkeaha is made by local administration above the village level. In one village, 
the involvement of an NGO was reported. Therefore, sangkeaha is an activity that is initiated and 
diffused mostly by local people themselves without involvement of actors outside their own 
community.
　To the author's knowledge, in Cambodia, sangkeaha or an activity of the same sort seem to be 
found only in limited part of the country, such as Takeo and Kampong Speu provinces (these are 
provinces neighboring each other). Yagura (2005) is also based on data collected in Treang district. 
Cases of sangkeaha examined in Chhair (2012) are also from these two provinces and they are 
operated in similar ways as sangkeaha examined in the present paper.
４．For whom sangkeaha is organized
　Simply described, sangkeaha is an activity by which villagers systematically donate money and 
goods to those who suffer from hardship for some reason. Although the conditions for which 
sangkeaha is organized vary among villages, in all but one village, a donation is collected for severely 
ill or injured people. In some villages, sangkeaha is also used to help impoverished (unrelated to 
illness) people and those who are weakening progressively because of old age (not illness).
　As presented later, donations are generally made on a voluntary basis. In addition, receiving 
benefits through sangkeaha is not conditional on making donations to sangkeaha for other villagers: 
sangkeaha can be organized for anyone who suffers from a hardship for reasons described above 
even if that person (or that person’s family) has rarely participated in sangkeaha for other villagers.
　In some villages, sangkeaha is organized only for those who meet some criteria. For example, 
sangkeaha is organized only for poor people in 14 villages (not organized for wealthy people even 
when they become severely ill), and only for elderly people in five villages. In 17 villages, illness and 
injury of children or infants are excluded from the sangkeaha coverage. In these villages, the reason 
for excluding children is that “it is the parents’ responsibility to take care of their children” and 
“illnesses of children are easy to cure and are not protracted.” Aside from the villages described 
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above, 91 villages, or 72% of the villages with sangkeaha, have a policy that is applicable to organize 
sangkeaha for any villager, irrespective of their age or economic status.
５．Collection of donations
　Village chiefs and achars assume the role of organizer to collect donations from villagers in most 
villages. Donations made to sangkeaha generally follow the procedures for administration described 
below.
1)  Organizers learn of the existence of a villager suffering from some hardship (e.g. a villager who 
becomes severely ill).
2)  Organizers decide whether sangkeaha should be organized for that villager.
3)  Organizers announce the sangkeaha implementation to villagers (by a loudspeaker or door-to-
door visits)
4)  On the day of sangkeaha, villagers visit the house of the recipient to make a donation; organizers 
also wait there.
　Some villages adopt different procedures. For example, in nine villages, organizers visit villagers’ 
homes to collect donations and take them to the recipient. The donation is made by the household 
unit: each household makes one donation. The amount of donation is freely determined by the donor 
except in some villages where the minimum amount of donation is set, as discussed later.
　In most villages, the name of the donor and the amount of the donation of each donor are 
registered in a notebook when making a donation. This notebook is usually kept by the recipient 
herself, although in some villages organizers keep it. This register is used by the recipient to 
determine an appropriate amount of future donations when sangkeaha is organized for other 
villagers; the recipient typically tries to donate as much money or more than the donor villager gave 
her when she needed it.
　Sangkeaha is organized at a village level. Therefore, participants are mainly limited to the villagers 
themselves. However, in some cases, relatives and close friends of the recipient living in neighboring 
villages also come to donate.
　In no village is making a donation in sangkeaha mandatory in a strict sense. Therefore, people are 
able to decide by themselves whether to participate in a sangkeaha or not. According to the village 
survey, informants of 73 villages responded that villagers must participate in sangkeaha (and make 
donations). However, 26 of these villages have a participation rate (an average share of households 
in the village that participate in each sangkeaha) of less than 90%; and eight of these 26 villages have 
a participation rate lower than 70%. These figures suggest that, in reality, donations are not 
compulsory. In fact, no measure is introduced to force villagers to make donations: according to the 
organizers survey, no village punishes those who fail to participate in sangkeaha or demand that they 
donate funds at a later date.
　However, 13 villages set a minimum amount of donation per household to increase the donations. 
The amount is 1,000‒3,000 riels.3） Nevertheless, this is not a strict rule. For example, in one village, 
the minimum donation was set to 3,000 riels per household in 2009; even so, donations of less than 
Community-based Charity-type Safety Nets against Health Shock: The Case of Sangkeaha in Rural Cambodia
Page:11無断転載禁止　
12
阪南論集　社会科学編 Vol. 48 No. 2
3,000 riels are also accepted with no sanction. Nevertheless, the sangkeaha organizer of the village 
perceived that a large share of villagers tend to donate 3,000 riels or more since the minimum was 
set.
Table 1. Village-level participation rate (R）
Number of village %
R<50% 3 2.4
50<－R<70 12 9.5
70<－R<90 42 33.3
90<－R 69 54.8
Total 126 100.0
Source : Prepared by the author with the data collected 
through the village survey.
Ⅳ．Impact of Sangkeaha
　To elucidate the extent to which people participate in sangkeaha in each village, in the village 
survey, informants (village chiefs or achars) were asked the average share of households in the 
village participating in each time of sangkeaha. Table 1 presents the result. Although the figures are 
rough estimates by informants, they show that most households participate in sangkeaha. The 
participation rate is 90% or higher for 55% of the villages, and 88% of the villages have a 
participation rate of 70% or higher.
　More precise figures of the participation rate were obtained in the 12 villages through the 
organizer survey, in which we collected information related to sangkeaha implemented in the 12 
villages during January‒August 2010. During this period, sangkeaha had been organized for 43 people 
in the 12 villages, and the proportion of households which participated in each sangkeaha in the 
respective village, or household participation rate, was 74.6% on average.4) Participation rates vary 
greatly according to villages, they were greater than 90% in three villages, but less than 50% in 
three other villages.
　In sangkeaha for these 43 people, the average cash donation per participating household was 2,335 
riels, and the average sum of cash donation per sangkeaha disbursement was 263,298 riels. This 
amount is not small. It is equivalent to 20-25 days pay for agricultural wage work in the district as 
of the time of the survey. However, large differences were found in the amounts of donations among 
cases. The sum of the donation was only 55,000 riels for the lowest case, although for the highest 
case 600,000 riels was collected. The average donation per participating household also varied greatly 
by village: in some villages, each participating household donated more than 3,000 riels on average 
but in one village, only 720 riels were donated on average.
　In addition to cash, rice is also donated in most villages. In the 12 sample villages of the organizer 
survey, 39.5 kg of husked rice (which is equivalent approximately to 80,000 riels in value) was 
donated on average per sangkeaha disbursement.
　Although the amount of donation described above is not a small amount for rural households in 
Cambodia, it is still insufficient to cover medical expenses incurred by the recipients in most cases, 
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as confirmed by the result of the recipient survey, for which we interviewed 22 recipients (or their 
family) of the prior two sangkeaha disbursements organized in 2010 in each village. For these 22 
recipients, the average coverage rate (donation received/medical expenses) was only 40.8%. 
Although coverage rates in some cases exceeded 100% (they received more donations than they 
spent on medical treatment), the coverage rate was less than 50% for 17 of the 22 cases. The low 
coverage rates resulted from the large sums necessary for medical expenses. On average, recipients 
(or their family) spent about 2.5 million riels to treat their illness or injuries for which sangkeaha was 
organized, although they received only 0.36 million riels through sangkeaha, even if including the 
value of donated rice.
　Furthermore, even if anyone in the village becomes severely ill or injured, sangkeaha is not always 
organized. According to the household survey, among 54 cases in which any member of household 
(or family member living separately) became severely ill or injured in 2010, sangkeaha was 
organized only for eight cases, even though the average medical expenditure for the other 46 cases 
was as large as 2.3 million riels.
Ⅴ．Motives to give people benefits in sangkeaha
１．Elements evoking the motives of donation
　This section examines motives of people to make donation in sangkeaha.
　Before empirical analysis, this subsection discusses what kind of motives people are more likely to 
have in making donation under the rules of sangkeaha and the way it is organized based on the 
theoretical argument in Section Ⅱ.
　First, because of voluntary participation, which is the indispensable element of a charity-type 
safety net, it is less likely that people make donation in order to avoid sanction and gain insurance. 
Instead, altruistic motive would be perceived as their major motive.
　As presented in Section Ⅱ, altruism has two sub-types, and the way sangkeaha is organized can 
evoke both types of altruism. Hedonic altruism is induced by two elements. First, sangkeaha is 
organized whenever a villager gets seriously ill and therefore villagers clearly know who the 
recipient is. Second, in most villages surveyed, villagers visit the recipient to make a donation. Under 
such situation, villagers are more likely to feel sympathy toward recipients and have a sense that 
their donation really helps recipients.
　Normative altruism is evoked by the apparent linkage between the donation in sangkeaha and 
merit-making, which is highly valued in Theravada Buddhism in Cambodia. According to the 
organizer survey, organizers of 10 of the 12 sample villages emphasize merit-making when they call 
villagers for joining sangkeaha. People in the villages surveyed think that they can make merit 
through deeds of various kinds, and participation in sangkeaha is one of them. In fact, 94% of the 
respondents in the household survey answered that they were always conscious of merit-making 
when they participate in sangkeaha. In this regard, however, some sangkeaha organizers reported to 
the author that one can make merit by making a donation through sangkeaha only if one purely 
intends to help the recipient. This argument suggests that normative altruism underlies merit-
making as the motive.
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　Returning a favor in dyadic reciprocal relationship can also be the motive to donate because in 
most villages donors and recipients can identify each other. Donors can identify recipients because 
sangkeaha is organized for a specific villager and because in most villages they visit recipient’s home 
to make donation. Recipients can also definitely identify donors by the registration of the name of 
donors and the amount of their donation. As mentioned above, the registration is intended to be used 
to return favors to donors.
　As mentioned above, in most villages, sangkeaha is organized for any villagers irrespective of their 
economic status and age. Under this condition, as suggested in Section Ⅱ, villagers can also have 
general reciprocity in mind when making donation. That is, one would feel obliged to make donation 
for other villagers in general because she can believe that villagers will help her once she gets 
seriously ill.
　Though making donation is not the prerequisite for receiving donation in sangkeaha, people can 
have insurance motive because two conditions are met: dyadic reciprocal relationship is formed 
between donors and recipients and any villagers has a chance to become a recipient. When returning 
a favor in dyadic relationship between donors and recipients constitutes people’s motives of donation, 
a villager who participates in sangkeaha every time and makes larger donation for other villagers 
would be able to receive larger donation once sangkeaha is organized for her because other villagers 
want to return a favor to her. Therefore, villagers may make (larger) donation in sangkeaha in order 
to receive larger donation when they become ill. Furthermore, according to the organizer survey, 
organizers of some villages emphasize that “if you do not help other villagers, they will not help 
you” when calling for villagers to join sangkeaha, which may lead people to regard participation in 
sangkeaha as a kind of security against adverse future shocks. In this regard, however, villagers can 
have such a motive only when they anticipate becoming recipient in future.
２．Qualitative assessment
　This subsection examines people’s motives using data collected from sample households.
　To begin with, motives indicated by people themselves will be examined. In the household survey 
we asked those who generally participate in sangkeaha (295 households) the reason why. The 
responses are presented in Table 2. The following motives are manifested by these responses.
Table 2. Reasons for participating in sangkeaha
Na %b
Villagers should help each other 264 89.5
To help those who suffer hardship 173 58.6
To make merit  82 27.8
So that villagers help my family when we get sick in future  19  6.4
Villagers have to participate as an obligation   5  1.7
Other reasons  17  5.8
Source : Prepared by the author with the data collected through the household survey.
Notes : Reasons for participating in sangkeaha cited by those who generally pareticipate in 
it (295 respondents). Multipul answeres are allowed.
a) Number of respondents citing the respective reason.
b) Proportion of respondents citing the respective reason.
　First, altruistic feelings about recipients seem to be one of major motives. In fact, Table 2 shows 
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that 59% of respondents reported “we should help those who suffer hardship” as their reason for 
participation. This response also suggests that it is more “normative altruism,” or seeing the good of 
some other people as a value in itself (Kolm, 2006), that constitutes their motive than “hedonic 
altruism,” or feeling happier because someone is happier (Kolm, 2006). The importance of normative 
altruism as a motive is also reflected in the fact that merit-making is cited as a reason for 
participation by 28% of respondents (Table 2).
　Second, people are apparently induced to make donations through a moral imperative or the norm 
of returning favors in the context of reciprocal relationship with other villagers. As shown in Table 
2, nearly 90% of the respondents cited “villagers should help each other” as their reason for 
participation. Although this clearly illustrates that people share solidarity norms within village, it also 
implies that people consider it imperative to help other villagers because other villagers would help 
the participant’s family in times of hardship. This further implies that people have in mind general 
reciprocity rather than dyadic reciprocity when making donation.
　Finally, insurance motive also seem to underlie people’s participation in sangkeaha. In fact, Table 2 
shows that some, but not many, respondents participate in sangkeaha because they believe that by 
doing so they can expect future help from other villagers. Although receiving a benefit through 
sangkeaha is not conditional on making a donation to sangkeaha for other villagers, making a large 
donation to sangkeaha for other villagers is seen as an increase the expected amount of future benefit 
a person or family might receive through sangkeaha if the norm of returning a favor constitutes 
people’s motive to participate, as argued above.
　In addition, the four motives presented above are not mutually contradictory because people can 
be affected by various motives simultaneously. Rather, they are closely related mutually; therefore 
the four motives can coexist.
３．Econometric analysis
　Next, we use econometric analysis to examine whether the motives described above explain 
participation in sangkeaha.
　We use the information on the last two times of sangkeaha implemented in the village in 2010. For 
each time of sangkeaha, we have data of sample households on whether they participated in that time 
of sangkeaha, and, if they participated, how much they donated. Therefore, we have a data set in 
which each sample household is represented by two observations. (for households in two villages 
where sangkeaha was organized only once in 2010, only one observation corresponding to that one 
time of sangkeaha is defined).
　Using this data set, two equations, the participation equation and the donation equation, are 
estimated. For the former, the dependent variables is a dummy variable indicating whether 
household participated in each time of sangkeaha, For the latter, the amount of donation, defined as 
the logarithm of sum of cash donation and the monetary value of the rice donation in each time of 
sangkeaha.
　Based on the theoretical model presented in Section 2, we propose explanatory variables with 
which we can assess whether a certain motive underlies sample households’ donation behavior and 
the extent to which the motive induce donation.
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　Effect of altruistic motive, including both hedonic and normative ones, is assessed by the asset size 
of the recipient, assuming that asset holding represent the economic status of a household. The 
negative sign for this variable indicates that altruism is behind people’s donation.
　In addition, whether normative altruism constitutes people’s motives can be assessed by a variable 
representing the consciousness of the informant that making donation is an act of merit making. In 
concrete, we asked a question of whether and how often the informant (=donor) is conscious of 
merit-making when she participates in sangkeaha (choosing from “no,” “sometimes” and “always”), 
and then construct a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the answer to this question is “always” 
and 0 otherwise.５) A positive and significant coefficient for this variable shows that normative 
altruism, manifested by aspiration for merit-making, constitutes people’s motives.
　To examine whether donation is based on dyadic reciprocity, we introduce a variable“help by the 
recipient,” which is defined as the first component of principal component analysis of three dummy 
variables representing whether the informant’s household has ever been helped by the (household 
of) recipient (giving money; lending money without interest; helping with farm work).６) The 
positive coefficient for this variable indicates that people make donation to return a favor to the 
recipient with dyadic reciprocal relationship.
　Whether insurance motive and/or general reciprocity underlies the donation behavior can be 
assessed by examining the effect of the probability for the sample household of becoming a recipient, 
which can be represented by the probability of experiencing health shocks because sangkeaha is 
organized mostly for those who get seriously ill. In concrete, we use the number of household 
members with chronic disease as the variable representing the health shock probability. The positive 
coefficient indicates significance of insurance motive and/or general reciprocity in encouraging 
donation.
　In addition, because the effect of non-insurance motive can vary according to the economic status 
of the donor as demonstrated in Section Ⅱ, we also include interaction terms of the variables 
representing non-insurance motive given above and informant’s asset size (non-land productive 
assets).７)
　Other explanatory variables include variables representing the attributes of the donor household 
as well as the recipient household, to examine whether donors change their behavior according to 
the demographic and economic status of the recipient household.
　The household attributes variables include the age and the educational level of household head 
and the number of household members (grouped by age category). As variables reflecting the 
economic status of households, the area of farmland owned and non-land productive assets８) are 
used. A dummy variable indicating a female-headed household is also introduced because female-
headed households, lacking male labor force, are often regarded as economically disadvantaged in 
rural Cambodia.
　A dummy variable indicating whether the recipient is old age or not (aged 60 or older) is also 
included to assess whether old age, which generally leads economic vulnerability, attract donation.
　In addition, the relationship between the informant (or family) and the recipient (or family), such 
as whether they are relatives, whether they are partners of exchange labor for farm work, and 
whether they are in the same neighborhood (in the same krom),９) are also used. These variables are 
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hypothesized to have positive effect because of the norm of helping each other or the relationship of 
dyadic reciprocity would be strong for between relatives, labor-exchange partners, and neighbors. 
As for being “in the same neighborhood,” it would also facilitate participation in sangkeaha because 
of the closeness of the recipient’s home (making it easy to visit the recipient).
　Finally, to account for village-specific effects, village dummy variables are also introduced.
　Some econometric issues need attention.10) First, because the amount of donation is only observed 
for those households which participated in sangkeaha, estimating the donation equation separately 
from the participation equation can entail sample selection bias. To correct for the selection bias, the 
sample selection model is also estimated by the maximum likelihood method (ML), in which the two 
equations are estimated simultaneously with allowing for correlation between the error terms of the 
two equations.11) However, the correlation coefficient between the error terms is not significant 
(p=1.00),12) which means that the selection bias can be ignored. Therefore, the two equations are 
estimated separately, with the participation equation by the probit model and the donation equation 
by OLS.
　Second, the variable “help by the recipient” can cause endogeneity bias if included as an 
exogenous variable in the equations. Because unobservable factors of the recipient’s economic 
situation and relationship between the recipient and the informant would affect both the help by the 
recipient to the informants and informant’s donation to the recipient, “help by the recipient” is likely 
to be correlated with the error terms of the participation and the donation equations. To correct for 
the possible endogeneity bias, we estimate an equation determining “help by the recipient” and the 
participation or the donation equation simultaneously by ML, with including “helped by the 
recipient” in the latter equations and allowing for correlation between the error terms of the two 
equations.13) As instrumental variables, three variables representing the relationship between the 
recipient and the informant mentioned above (being relatives, labor-exchange partner, and in the 
same neighborhood) are used. These three variables are found to be appropriate as instruments 
because they are basically significant only in the “help by the recipient” equation but not in the 
participation or the donation equation when the two equations are estimated simultaneously in the 
way mentioned above.
　Fourth, because each household has fundamentally two observations (one observation for one time 
of sangkeaha), there will be correlation in error terms within a household, which reflects 
unobservable factors of each household. Therefore, estimated standard errors are corrected for the 
within-household correlation.14)
　Estimation results are presented in Table 3. Regarding the interaction terms of non-land asset and 
the motive variables, only significant ones are retained in the estimation.
　First, we examine the models not including “helped by the recipient.” The asset size of the 
recipient is not significant in both equations. Based on the theory presented in Section Ⅱ, this result 
implies that altruism is insignificant as a motive. However, “consciousness of merit-making” has 
positive and significant coefficient in the participation equation. Based on this estimation result, the 
change in this variable from 0 to 1 leads to a 16.6 percentage point increase in the expected 
probability of participation.15) This indicates that normative altruism is one of major motives.
　The number of chronically-ill members also has positive effect on participation, and expected 
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Table 3. Determinant factors of participation in sangkeaha and the amount of donation made
Participation (probit) Amount of donation (OLS)
Coefficient z Coefficient t
Attributes of household surveyed
Age of household head  0.014 (1.58)  0.001 (0.24)
Educational level of household heada -0.035 (0.30) -0.006 (0.17)
Number of household member aged 14 and under -0.093 (1.21) -0.009 (0.46)
Number of household member aged 15-59 -0.097 * (1.74)  0.048 ** (2.61)
Number of household member aged 60 and over  0.293 * (1.82)  0.039 (0.82)
Female headed household (dummy) -0.211 (0.82)  0.106 (1.58)
ln (Area of farmland owned+1)  0.156 * (1.84)  0.025 (0.79)
ln (Non-land asset+1)  0.969 *** (3.07)  0.090 *** (2.90)
Number of household members with chronic  0.575 *** (2.62) -0.014 (0.51)
disease
Perception of merit-making in participating  2.026** (2.39)  0.061 (0.74)
sangkeaha (dummy)
Attributes of recipient or his/her household
Number of household member aged 14 and under  0.047 (0.23) -0.066 (1.54)
Number of household member aged 15-59 -0.126 (0.68) -0.020 (0.55)
Number of household member aged 60 and over -0.918 ** (2.24) -0.143 ** (2.13)
Female headed household (dummy) -0.465 (1.05) -0.158 * (1.94)
ln (Area of farmland owned+1)  0.079 (0.43)  0.030 (0.84)
ln (Non-land asset+1)  0.061 (0.28)  0.061 (1.20)
The recipient is aged 60 and over  0.500 (1.24)  0.156 ** (2.05)
Relation between the household surveyed and
the recipient
Relative (dummy)  0.161 (0.71)  0.109 ** (2.15)
Partner of labor exchange in farming (dummy)  0.442 ** (2.01)  0.114 *** (2.47)
Living in the same neighborhood (dummy)  0.390 (1.33)  0.245 *** (3.89)
Interaction terms
［ln(Non-land asset+1) (household surveyed)］ -0.211 ** (2.45)
×［Number of household members with chronic
disease］
［ln(Non-land asset+1) (household surveyed)］ -0.644 ** (2.02)
×［Perception of merit-making in pareticipating
sangkeaha］
Constant -2.958 (1.93)  7.552 (26.9)
R2  0.23b  0.52
N    526    438
Source : Prepared by the author
Notes : Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of z-statistic or t-statisic. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 
5%, *** 1%. The standard errors are adjusted for the correlation within household. Village dummy variables are 
also included as explanatory variables but the coefficients are not reported in this table.
a) 0: no schooling; 1 : primary school; 2 : junior high school; 3 : high school; 4 : higher education.
b) Pseudo R2.
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participation probability rises by 2.6 percentage point with an increase in the number of chronically-
ill member from 0 to 1. This result suggests that insurance motive and/or general reciprocity 
promotes people’s participation in sangkeaha. Although the number of chronically-ill members is not 
significant in the donation equation, it can be explained by the negative effect of the economic 
burden of having many ill-members in household (the economic disadvantage does not hinder 
participation because making only a small donation is also allowed).
　The interaction terms of non-land assets and the consciousness of merit-making as well as the 
number of chronically-ill members are both significant in the participation equation (in the donation 
function, the interaction terms are not significant and thus removed from the equation). Their signs 
are negative, indicating that the effect of these variables decrease with the non-land asset holding. 
This result is in accordance with the theoretical prediction presented in Section Ⅱ; the non-
insurance motives exert critical influence on participation especially for poorer donors.
　As is expected, the three variables indicating the close relationship between the informant (donor) 
and the recipient are all positive and mostly significant in both participation and the donation 
equations. This result indicates that the closeness of the relationship induce donation, though exact 
motives for the donation cannot be identified only by these variables.
　It is also worth noting that informant’s asset, farmland or non-land assets, has positive significant 
effect on both participation and the amount of donation, implying that sangkeaha can have income-
redistribution effect. This result also suggests that non-insurance motives are strong, according to 
our theoretical analysis given in Section Ⅱ.
　Next, the model including the variable “help by the recipient” is examined. As shown in the last 
line of Table 4, the exogeneity of “help by the recipient” is rejected, which means that the estimation 
method allowing for the endongeneity of “helped by the recipient” is appropriate.16)
Table 4. Effect of the extent to which the informant was helped by the recipient
Participation Amount of donation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Help by the recipient 0.780 ***  2.242 ** 0.222 *** 0.113
(3.62)  (2.41) (6.28) (1.60)
［ln(Non-land asset+1) (household surveyed)］ -0.647 * 0.042 *
×［Help by the recipient］ (1.65) (1.82)
N 525  525 437 437
Test of the exogeneity of
0.09  0.16 0.00 0.00
“Help by the recipient” (p-value)a
Source : Prepared by the author
Notes : Coefficients for other variables are omitted from the table. Figures in parentheses are the 
absolute values of z-statistic. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. The standard errors are 
adjusted for the correlation within household.
a)  Wald test for the participation equation and liklihood ratio test for the donation equation are conducted 
on the null hypothes that correlation between the error terms of the two equation is zero.
　As presented in Table 4, even after accounting for the endogeneity, the extent to which the 
informants was helped by the recipient has significant positive effect on both participation and the 
amount of donation. The effect is large. Based on the estimation result shown in column (1) and (3), 
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an increase in the variable “help by the recipient” by 1-standard deviation (from the mean value of 
0 to 1.277) raises the expected probability of participation by 9.5 percentage points(from 88.2% to 
97.7%) and the amount of donation by 1,298 riels (from 3,952 to 5,250 riels). This result clearly shows 
returning a favor in the context of dyadic reciprocity constitutes people’s motives of making 
donation in sangkeaha.
　As presented in column (2) and (4), the interaction term of “helped by the recipient” and 
informant’s non-land asset, if included, is weakly significant. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
negative in the participation equation but it is positive in the donation equation. This result indicates 
that returning a favor to the recipient is an important motive of participating in sangkeaha for poorer 
people while it increases the amount of donation by wealthier people.
　As is already mentioned, when “helped by the recipient” is included, neither of three variables 
indicating the close relationship between the informant and the recipient is significant if included in 
the participation and the donation equations. This suggests that people’s participation and donation 
are encouraged for the recipient with close relationship not because the close relationship per se 
engenders altruistic feeling, but just because they have the relationship of dyadic reciprocity. In any 
case, the econometric analysis clearly indicates that personal relationship with the recipient strongly 
affects people’s donation behavior in sangkeaha even though it is organized as a village-level charity.
Ⅵ．Beneficiary of Sangkeaha
　This section investigates whether poor people benefit throughs sangkeaha on an equality with non-
poor people by an econometric examination of the relation between economic status of household 
and degree to which households benefit from sangkeaha.
　According to the econometric analysis in the previous section, asset holding of the recipient does 
not have a significant effect on the participation and the amount of donation, which implies that poor 
people are not favored nor are discriminated in sangkeaha. But the analysis in the previous section is 
not sufficient for examining the effect of the recipient’s economic status because it used information 
of only 22 recipients. Therefore, this section utilizes data of the past experience of the 300 sample 
households with regard to becoming recipient of donation in sangekaha.
　Two indicators are used to represent the degree to which a household benefit through sangkeaha: 
“the number of times each household received donations through sangkeaha during 2005‒2010,” and 
“the amount of donations received by a household in each sangkeaha disbursement.” These indicators 
as dependent variables are separately regressed on various attributes of households. Therefore, two 
equations are estimated.
　The equation explaining“the number of times each household received donations” is modeled as 
Poisson count model with a household as the unit of observation.
　For the equation explaining “the amount of donations received,” the unit of the observation is a 
sangkeaha disbursement. In this case, the sample includes only those households for which sangkeaha 
was organized during 2005-2010. Therefore, the sample selection model was estimated in which the 
selection criterion is whether sangkeaha was organized for the household during that period.17) 
However, the null hypothesis, that the correlation coefficient for the error terms of the selection 
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equation and the outcome equation (which determines the amount of donation received) is zero, 
could not be rejected (p=0.996). Therefore, the outcome equation is independently estimated by OLS 
using only the selected sample. In this equation, households for which more than one incidence of 
sangkeaha was organized have two or more observations, and therefore standard errors are 
corrected for possible within-household correlation.
　Explanatory variables include the same variables representing household’s attributes as were 
included in the participation and the donation functions estimated in the previous section. Village 
dummy variables are also included. For “the number of times” equation, the number of cases of 
severe illness or injuries of household members during 2005-2010 is also used as an explanatory 
variable because sangkeaha would be organized for such cases. For “the amount of donations 
received” equation, the attribute of the recipient (=patient), or dummy variables indicating whether 
the recipient is husband, wife, father of either husband or wife, mother of either husband or wife, are 
also included as explanatory variables because donors might take into consideration who the 
recipient is in deciding their amount of donation.
　Estimation results are presented in Table 5. Among the explanatory variables for“the number of 
times,” only the number of cases of severe illness/injuries is significant (and positive). Demographic 
variables as well as variables representing household’s asset holding are all insignificant. This result 
suggests that sangkeaha is organized irrespective of the demographic and economic situation of 
household as long as any villager gets serious illness or injuries. In other words, conforming to its 
charitable nature, sangkeaha is organized rather equally for all households.
　As for the amount of donation received, besides variables representing who the recipient was, 
non-land asset and its square have significant impact. This result means that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between non-land asset and the amount of donation received. Based on the estimation 
results, the predicted amount of donation received decreases as non-land asset increases up to 14, 
which is near its mean value of 13, but then it increases as non-land asset further increases. This 
result implies that, while altruistic motive induces people to make larger amount of donation to 
poorer recipients, effect of other motives become relatively strong for better-off recipients. A 
plausible motive to donate to better-off recipients is returning a favor to the recipient who helped 
the donor in the past. Insurance motive can also induce donation to wealthy recipients because one 
can expect larger amount of help in return from wealthy recipients. Therefore, the analysis in this 
section also indicates that donation in sangkeaha is induced not only by altruism but also by 
reciprocity and insurance motive.
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Ⅶ．Rules Promoting Participation
　As revealed in Sections Ⅴ and Ⅵ, various motives besides altruistic motive induce people to make 
donation in sangkeaha. Nevertheless, as shown in Section Ⅳ, in some villages the participation rate is 
not so high, and sangkeaha often fails to collect sufficient donation to cover the medical cost incurred 
by the recipient’s household. The unsatisfactory performance of sangkeaha can be attributable partly 
to its voluntary participation rule. Though voluntary participation evokes non-insurance motives, 
Table 5. Determinant factors of receiving donation through sangkeaha
Number of times receiving
donation through sangkeaha
(Poisson count model)
Amount of donation
received through sangkeaha
(OLS)
Coefficents z Coefficents t
Age of household head  0.000 (0.02)    -401 (0.18)
Educational level of household  0.000 (0.00) -31,699 (0.88)
heada
Number of household member aged  0.079 (0.76)  13,063 (0.97)
14 and under
Number of household member aged -0.069 (0.88)     416 (0.04)
15-59
Number of household member aged  0.091 (0.45)  21,031 (0.50)
60 and over
Female headed household (dummy)  0.488 (1.52) -39,743 (0.64)
ln (Area of farmland owned+1) -0.151 (1.62)  24,855 (1.60)
Non-land asset -16,433 *** (3.48)
［Non-land asset］2     580 *** (7.29)
ln(Non-land asset+1)  0.107 (0.76)
Number of household members with  0.175 (1.39)  11,315 (0.71)
chronic disease
Number of cases of serious illness  0.459 *** (2.90)
of household member
The recipient is husband (dummy) 103,292 * (1.94)
The recipient is wife (dummy)  78,257 (1.31)
The recipient is father of husband or 141,747 * (1.72)
wife (dummy)
The recipient is mother of husband  41,810 (0.80)
or wife (dummy)
Constant -0.938 (1.13) 105,070 (0.80)
R2  0.10b    0.79
N    296     83
Source : Prepared by the author
Notes : Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of z-statistic or t-statistic. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 
5%, *** 1%. The standard errors are adjusted for the correlation within household. Village dummy variables 
are also included as explanatory variables but the coefficients are not reported in this table.
a) See the notes of Table 3.
b) Pseudo R2.
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especially altruistic motive, and thus brings the advantage that poor people are not excluded, it also 
seems to cause the low participation rate and smaller amount of donation collected in some villages.
　How can we promote people’s participation in sangkeaha without discarding the voluntary 
participation rule? If rules provide people with motives to participate, as argued in Section Ⅱ, the 
key is to adopt rules that encourage people’s participation. This section therefore examines with 
econometric method the relationship between the rule of sangkeaha and participation rate using 
village level data. Concretely, village-level participation rate as dependent variable is regressed on 
variables representing sangkeaha’s rule (or the way it is organized) as well as attributes of the 
village.
　The following three rules are hypothesized to evoke some specific motives and thus affect 
participation rate. The first is “unconditionality,” or the rule that sangkeaha is organized for any 
villagers irrespective of their economic status and age. Under this rule, as discussed in Section Ⅱ, 
insurance motive and general reciprocity can induce people’s participation. The second is “making 
donation by visiting the recipient’s home.” As pointed out in Section Ⅱ, this way of donation can 
evoke hedonic altruism and dyadic reciprocity. The third is “the registering of donor’s name and the 
amount of donation,” which apparently evokes dyadic reciprocity. Each of these rules is represented 
by a dummy variable, which takes value one if the village has that rule, and zero otherwise. Among 
113 sample villages for which the participation equation is estimated, 72% has the unconditionality 
rule. Both “visiting recipient’s home”and “registration” are rules adopted by 92% of the sample 
villages, though not all the villages with the former rule and those with the latter rule overlap.
　Village attributes used as explanatory variables include the number of household in the village, 
which is expected to have negative effect on the participation rate because in a village with a large 
number of households each villager can form reciprocal and altruistic relationship only with small 
portion of villagers. Large villages may also have difficulty in dissemination of the information of 
holding sangkeaha. The area of farmland per household (classified into three by land type) is also 
included to control economic condition of the village. Commune dummies are also included to control 
the commune-specific effects, such as economic conditions not reflected in the area of farmland.
　The dependent variable, participation rate, is expressed as an ordered variable ranging from 1 to 6 
depending on the participation rate inferred by respondents (i.e. sangkeaha organizers of each 
village).18） The ordered variable rather than continuous variable is used because respondents often 
gave the figure of participation rate with some range of variation.
　Naturally, only villages with sangkeaha can be used for the estimation, but this can cause the 
selection bias if whether a village has sangkeaha is not randomly determined. However, the result of 
the estimation of sample selection model, in which the selection equation determines whether a 
village has sangkeaha, indicates that the selection bias can be ignored.19) Therefore, “participation 
rate equation” is estimated independently by the ordered probit model.
　Estimation results are shown in Table 6. As presented in column (1), all the rule variables are not 
significant. On the other hand, as predicted, the coefficient of the number of household in the village 
is negative and significant. This result indicates that in a large village only a smaller portion of 
villagers can have reciprocal and altruistic relationship with the recipient. This further suggests that 
the effect of rule can vary according to the village size. For example, the unconditionality rule may 
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promote participation especially in large villages because the sense of general reciprocity, which is 
evoked by this rule, would be felt by people even if they do not have personal relationship with the 
recipient.
Table 6. Participation rate equation (ordered probit model)
(1) (2)
Coefficients z Coefficients z
Village attributes
Number of household -0.007 ** (2.45) -0.018 *** (2.85)
Area of farmland per household -2.734 *** (2.96) -2.733 *** (2.98)
(wet season rice field)
［Area of farmland per household  0.686 ** (2.58)  0.703 *** (2.65)
(wet season rice field)］2
Area of farmland per household  1.758 * (1.91)  1.993 ** (2.06)
(dry season rice field)
［Area of farmland per household -0.723 ** (2.45) -0.902 *** (2.88)
(dry season rice field)］2
Area of farmland per household -3.215 (0.62) -3.617 (0.71)
(upland field)
Rule variables
Unconditionality  0.155 (0.51) -1.181 (1.45)
Visit to recipient's home -0.332 (0.67) -2.626 ** (2.14)
Registeration  0.499 (1.11)  1.166 (1.28)
［Unconditionality］  0.009 ** (2.02)
×［Number of household］
［Visit to recipient's home］  0.015 ** (2.36)
×［Number of household］
［Registration］ -0.009 * (1.66)
×［Number of household］
Pseudo R2  0.18  0.21
N   113   113
Source : Prepared by the author
Notes : Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of z-statistic. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, 
*** 1%. The standard errors are robust for heteroschadisticity. Commune dummy variables are also 
included as explanatory variables but the coefficients are not reported in this table.
Table 7. Effect of rules on participation rate by the number of household in the village
Number of 
household
Unconditionality Visit to recipient's home Registeration
50 -0.17 (0.13) -0.28 ** (0.08)  0.20 (0.20)
100 -0.08 (0.12) -0.27 ** (0.12)  0.09 (0.16)
150  0.06 (0.10) -0.13 (0.17) -0.05 (0.14)
200  0.19 * (0.10)  0.08 (0.16) -0.17 (0.15)
250  0.26 ** (0.11)  0.21 (0.13) -0.26 (0.17)
300  0.29 ** (0.13)  0.27 ** (0.11) -0.34 * (0.20)
Source : Prepared by the author
Notes : The figures indicate the changes in the probability of participation rate being 90 % or higher 
due to having the respective rule. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels: 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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　With this possibility in mind, a model with interaction terms of the number of household in the 
village and the each of the rule variable is also estimated. As shown in column (2) of Table 6, all the 
interaction terms are significant. To see how the effect of the rules changes according to village size, 
Table 7 presents changes in the predicted probability of the participation rate being 90% or more 
due to the change in the rule variable from 0 to 1 by the number of households in the village.
Unconditionality rule has a large positive effect in larger villages. For villages with 300 households, 
having the unconditionality rule increases the probability of the participation rate being 90% or 
higher by 29 percentage point. This result indicates that in larger villages, where altruism and 
dyadic reciprocity are less likely to constitute major motives for participation, participation rate 
would be increased by adopting rules under which the sense of general reciprocity induce people to 
make donation. This is also consistent with the fact that most informants cited “villagers should help 
each other” as their motive to make donation in sangkeaha, as presented above.
　The rule“visiting the recipient’s home”also has significant positive effect in villages with 300 
households, but it has significant negative effect in villages with 100 or less households. This result is 
puzzling, but may represent the effect of “collection of donation by sangkeaha organizers.” In villages 
where people do not visit to recipient’s home to make donation, sangkeaha organizers walk around 
the village to collect donation from villagers. This method of donation collection would be more 
effective in smaller villages because organizers can visit villagers’ houses many times in a day.
　The registration rule has weakly significant negative effect in villages with 300 households, 
indicating that a large proportion of villagers do not have personal relationship with the recipient in 
the first place in a large village and therefore evoking the sense of dyadic reciprocity is ineffective. 
Or, there can be reverse casualty: large villages with low participation rate might introduce the 
registration rule to promote people’s participation.
　As suggested by this argument, the adoption of rule might be endogenously determined by 
sangkeaha organizers depending on the characteristics of each village. This means that the estimation 
results may include some endogeneity biases and therefore further studies are needed to reach a 
definitive conclusion regarding the effect of rules on donation.
Ⅷ．Conclusion
　Sangkeaha is a community-based charity-type safety net, intended especially for illness, found in 
rural Cambodia. Unlike CBHI, it is not membership-based but is generally intended to provide 
protection to all members of a community. Using primary data collected in Treang district, Takeo 
province, this study examined the extent to which sangkeaha protects people against health shocks, 
with what motives people participate in it, who benefits more from it, and the effect of rules on 
people’s participation in sangkeaha. The findings are summarized as follows.
　Even though participation is voluntary, sangkeaha can collect large amounts of donations from 
people in light of the economic situation of rural Cambodia, but the amounts are nonetheless often 
insufficient to cover the medical costs that recipients incur. In addition, many cases of severe illness 
and injury are left unprotected even by sangkeaha.
　Though people’s donation is often insufficient, various motives besides simple altruism seem to 
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encourage them to make donation in sangekaha. People seem to make donation out of normative 
altruism because they regard donation in sangkeaha as merit-making. Because donors and the 
recipient are identified by each other, and because sangkeaha is organized for any villagers 
irrespective of their economic status and age in most villages, people seem to be conscious of 
relationships of mutual help among villagers through sangkeaha, and therefore they seem to 
participate in it to conform to the norm of returning favors in the context of both dyadic and general 
reciprocity. Because of the reciprocal relationship between villagers, insurance motive also seem to 
induce people to make donation.
　In line with the expectation for charity-type safety net, poor people are not discriminated against 
in sangkeaha. It is organized rather equally for all households irrespective of economic status. On the 
other hand, the amount of donation collected and the asset size of recipient has U-shaped 
relationship, which also indicates that donation in sangkeaha is also induced by reciprocity and 
insurance motive.
　As motives are shaped partly by rules of sangkeaha, the extent to which people participate in 
sangkeaha is influenced by rules adopted. The econometric analysis indicates that the 
unconditionality rule that any villager is eligible to receive donation increases the participation rate 
especially in large villages. This further indicates that people’s participation can be promoted by 
making them have the sense of general reciprocity.
　These findings provide some implications for safety-net policies in developing countries. First, this 
paper reveals the potential of community-based charity-type safety-net schemes for providing 
protection to rural populations in developing countries. Although the case of sangkeaha in rural 
Cambodia examined here indicates that safety-net provided by the charity-type scheme is often 
insufficient, this type of scheme is less likely to exclude poor people. Furthermore, the marked 
sustainability of sangkeaha indicates that charity-type schemes can maintain people’s participation. 
These merits can be attributable to the fact that people participate in a charity-type scheme with 
non-insurance (or non-selfish) motives such as altruism and the sense of general reciprocity. Owing 
to its sustainability, sangkeaha will continue to play an indispensable role in providing safety net to 
people in some part of rural Cambodia, at least until full-fledged public social security system is 
introduced in rural Cambodia in future.
　In this connection, the second implication is that charity-type schemes provide hints for CBHI. As 
mentioned in the introductory part, it is reported that CBHI schemes often experience problems 
such as the exclusion of the poorest segment of population and the high rate of drop-out. The case 
of sangkeaha indicates that these problems may be alleviated by making the members of a CBHI 
scheme perceive it as a mechanism of mutual help among them, rather than a mechanism of 
providing only personal benefit.
　Thirdly, however, it would not be easy to geographically diffuse the charity-type safety net 
scheme. Because altruism and the solidarity norm are key factors promoting people’s participation, it 
would be introduced only to cohesive communities in which its members have intimate relationships. 
In case of Cambodia, it would be no coincidence that sangkeaha is found in some part of Takeo and 
Kampong Speu provinces, where villages seem to have this character owing to their relatively long 
history of settlements. This indicates that the charity-type safety net scheme can be further diffused 
Community-based Charity-type Safety Nets against Health Shock: The Case of Sangkeaha in Rural Cambodia
Page:26無断転載禁止　
27
Community-based Charity-type Safety Nets against Health ShockMar. 2013
to other villages in these two provinces, as is evident from the fact that many sample villages started 
sangkeaha in the 2000s. On the other hand, it is less likely to be spread in villages in the Thai-border 
region because, rather recently settled by migrants from other part of the country, they are thought 
to be less cohesive.
　The importance of altruism also suggest that outside actors are not in a good position to take 
initiative to introduce a charity-type safety net scheme to communities because people cannot be 
forced to have altruistic feeling. In such circumstances, what the government and outside NGOs can 
do might be limited to dissemination of information of successful cases of sangkeaha-like activities as 
a good example to villages with no such activities.
　Finally, the case of sangkeaha provides counter evidence against a prevailing argument that 
increasing economic opportunities outside communities erode community-level safety-net 
arrangements in developing economies. As described earlier, many villages in Treang district started 
sangkeaha in the 2000s, when Cambodian rural households had increasing opportunities outside their 
community to earn their living and accumulate their wealth, such as labor migration to cities or sales 
of agricultural products for outside markets. This situation, by allowing the diversification of income, 
is likely to weaken the necessity of mutual help in villages (Morduch, 1999). Alternatively, making 
self-insurance possible might provoke the withdrawal of wealthier households from community-level 
risk-sharing arrangements (Fafchamps, 1992; Platteau, 2006). Sangkeaha has been diffused even 
under such a situation, apparently because obtaining insurance is not the only motive of people to 
participate in sangkeaha: altruism and merit-making based on it also constitute people’s motive. 
Importance of these motives, however, underscores that sangkeaha-like activities can be introduced 
only where people share other-regarding norms within their community.
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NOTES
１） Muslim societies have charitable activities based on the teachings of Islam such as zakah and sadaqa, in which 
some part of collected donation is given to the poor and the needy (see, for example, Ahmed 2004). But they 
differ from the charity-type safety net studied in the present paper in that they work as an aid to poor 
people rather than as safety net against shocks and that in case of zakah the charity is mostly organized by 
organizations covering larger geographical area rather than by each community.
２） When consumption level is very low, people would give priority to consumption over non-economic elements 
like non-insurance benefits assumed in this model. This means that the marginal utility of non-insurance 
benefits is small when the consumption level is low.
３） One US dollar was equivalent approximately to 4,200 riels at the time of the survey.
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４） The numbers of households per village in these 12 villages are 73‒302. The average is 165.
５） In constructing this variable, “no” and “sometimes” are merged into one category because “no” was 
indicated only by two respondents.
６） The first component explains 54 % of the total variance and the eigenvectors associated with these three 
variables are 0.623, 0.625 and 0.472, respectively.
７） See Note 8 for the definition of non-land asset variable. The non-land asset rather than landholding is used as 
the indicator of household’s economic status because the former has larger variation and thus can better 
explain the wealth difference between households than the latter. Furthermore, as sample households are 
selected from 12 villages, there would be a large variation in the quality of farmland according to the village, 
which means that the difference in landholding does not necessarily represent the difference in the economic 
status between households.
８） This variable is defined as the weighted sum of the number of non-land productive assets including draft 
animals, motorbikes, rice mills, pumps, power-tillers, threshers, harvesters, and cars. The weight is based on 
the prevailing price of the assets in the area surveyed.
９） A krom is a group formed by several households in the same neighborhood in a village. 
10） Statistical software STATA is used for the estimation of the econometric models presented in this paper.
11） In the sample selection model, the participation equation is specified as probit model and the donation 
equation as liner regression. For the estimation, we used STATA module ［cmp］, which enables the 
estimation of multi-equation systems in which the errors share a multivariate normal distribution.
12） Likelihood ratio test is performed for the sample selection model and separately estimated the participation 
equation and the donation equation.
13） STATA modules ［ivprobit］ and ［sem］ were used for the estimation of the participation equation and the 
donation equation, respectively. The explanatory variables of the “help by the recipient” equation include all 
the explanatory variables appearing in the participation and the donation equations and the instrumental 
variables. As for the donation equation, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is less restrictive model, in which, 
unlike ML, the joint normality of the error terms of the two equations are not assumed. But we adopted ML 
because 2SLS does not allow for the inclusion of interaction term of the endogenous explanatory variable and 
other explanatory variable. In fact, (without the interaction term) estimated parameters by ML are very 
close to those by 2SLS.
14） STATA’s option ［vce cluster］ is applied.
15） The marginal effect presented in this paper is the average of the marginal effect calculated for all the 
observations.
16） For the donation equation, the endogeneity of “help by the recipient” is also confirmed even if the equation is 
estimated by 2SLS (p=0.00; Dubin-Wu-Hausman test). The choice of the instrumental variables are also 
found to be statistically valid based on 2SLS estimation, as the test of the validity of the instruments 
(whether instruments has no correlation with error terms and are excluded correctly from the structural 
equation), and that of weak instrument (whether instruments are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable) are all passed.
17） STATA module ［heckman］ is used for the estimation. To satisfy the exclusion restriction (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005: 551), the number of cases of severe illness or injuries of household members during 2005‒2010 
is included in the selection equation but not in the outcome equation. This variable is not significant even if 
included in the outcome equation. 
18） The dependent variable takes value 1 for participation rate less than 50%, 2 for 50% or more and less than 
60%, 3 for 60% or more and less than 70%, 4 for 70% or more and less than 80%, 5 for 80% or more and less 
than 90%, and 6 for 90% or more.
19） Using STATA module ［cmp］, the selection equation specified as probit model and the participation equation 
specified as ordered probit model are estimated jointly by ML with allowing for the correlation between the 
error terms of the two equations. The explanatory variables of the selection equation include all the 
explanatory variables (except the rule variables) of the participation rate equation and an ordered variable 
with scale of 1 to 5 indicating the degree to which villagers rely on hired labor (instead of exchange labor) in 
their farm work to satisfy the exclusion restriction. The null hypothesis of no selectivity cannot be rejected, 
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as the estimated coefficient of correlation was not significant (p=0.42).
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